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What is Wrong With Takeover
Legislation
GEORGE

I.

C.

HOOK*

PERSPECTIVES

Much that is said to be wrong with takeover legislation is a
matter of one's perspective. To management, such legislation is not
effective enough and far too many hostile takeover attempts are
successful. To the bidder, takeover legislation is too effective, at least
in terms of delays, costs and other burdens. To the so-called disinterested or minority shareholders, takeover legislation can be desirable
or undesirable depending on its impact on the price of their stock.
To community-oriented legislators, such legislation is desirable if it
preserves local businesses and values. To federal regulators and,
apparently to most economists who have chosen to address this
subject, such legislation is undesirable because it adversely affects the
national markets and the national economy. To the nation as a whole,
takeover legislation is complex, contradictory, and replete with immediate and future consequences in the areas of corporate transactions, securities law, and estate planning, many of which may yet be
unforeseen.
The general perception is that management favors takeover legislation because such legislation helps management to preserve its
position. Ideally, from management's perspective, takeover legislation
will prevent takeovers either because takeovers are rendered virtually
impossible under the legislation or because they are too expensive,
time consuming, or risky in terms of the possible rewards.
It is not surprising that most state takeover legislation has been
adopted on short notice at the specific request of a major corporate
citizen under attack by an out-of-state bidder. Generally, the stated
purpose of takeover legislation is to preserve the local economy,
community, cultural and charitable values, jobs, and to assure fairer
treatment of resident shareholders. The unstated, but obvious, motive
Partner, McBride Baker & Coles, Chicago, Illinois. A.B., Knox College;
J.D., University of Chicago.
*
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is to preserve the major corporation and the jobs of those prominent
local individuals who comprise its management. The assumption
underlying these motives is that an out-of-state bidder is intent upon
busting up the target and thereby destroying the local economy, tax
base, charitable giving, culture, community, and jobs. However, it
seems unlikely that a bidder would want to pay so much to achieve
this end. It assumes of the bidder the same disregard for the value of
share ownership that arguably underlies much of the takeover legislation. The fallacy in this argument is that, although a competitor
might resort to such conquer and destroy tactics to eliminate competition, assuming that anti-trust laws and other factors did not preclude
it, presumably, bidders, like other business and financial people, are
motivated to pay only for what they value, to get the best bargain
possible, and then to utilize their acquisitions as best they can to
maximize their value. If this is so, and if acquirers are not incompetent, local interests should not be substantially harmed by a successful
takeover and may even be substantially enhanced by a takeover.
Management has attacked bidders as "raiders" who lack a longrange perspective, who purchase companies using the assets of the
target, and saddle companies with too much debt, or move factories
and destroy jobs without regard for the local community. This image
has resulted because self-preservation of "fat cats" does not play well
in the press and legislative chambers, and partially because the assumptions underlying the stated motivations may not ring true economically. The basic impetus for anti-takeover legislation, as
distinguished from the self-help that management can effect by such
things as poison pills, fair price amendments to the charter and other
shark repellents, is that it avoids board exposure to litigation and
obviates the need for a shareholder vote, which may be impossible to
obtain.'
As to shareholders, the general perception is that they oppose
takeover legislation because it adversely affects the price potential of
their stock. Shareholders want legislation which requires full disclosure
so that they may know whether they are getting a good value for their
stock should they choose to sell. They also want procedures which
will tend to maximize multiple bidding because that tends to maximize
price. Frequent bidders, such as T. Boone Pickens, have seemingly
done well to equate their interests with the common shareholder,
including pension and profit-sharing fund investors. They assert that
1. However, the new Delaware antitakeover law exposes the board to litigation
for failing to opt-out. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(4) (Supp. 1988).
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as the owners of corporations, the shareholders' interests are paramount. Thus, they argue that shareholders should be permitted to
make the decision whether to sell their stock without interference
from management, fellow shareholders, or interests outside the corporation. Support for this position is found among economists and
federal regulators who believe that a minimally fettered tender offer
process is the best way to discipline management and address problems
of economic stagnation.
Management of target corporations attempt to overcome this
shareholder position by asserting that they have fiduciary duties to
the shareholders and that they must be in a position to manage
information and offers made to shareholders. Management, in part,
wants takeover legislation as a tool to facilitate negotiations and
multiple bids to extract the highest price for its shareholders.
It is not an accurate perception that shareholders are entirely
motivated by the current stock price. Shareholders are a diverse lot,
consisting of target management, bidders, suppliers, employees, and
other community members who rely on the corporation for various
aspects of their well-being. There are long-term investors who may
feel that it is in their best interest to retain their investment in the
corporation. They may sell out of fear that a non-negotiated acquisition will adversely affect future dividends and stock appreciation.
However, a negotiated acquisition may have the same effect. While
the longer term investor's goals are different from those of the shortterm investor's, they complement each other; one providing trading
volume and the other providing market stability. Therefore, it is
difficult to categorize shareholders as being for or against takeover
legislation.
Of course, the desirability of a takeover statute depends somewhat
upon the type of legislation being considered. Such legislation exists
or is proposed in various forms at the state and federal levels.
II.

EXISTING FEDERAL LEGISLATION

A. THE WILLIAMS ACT
2
At the federal level governing tender offers is the Williams Act.
The Williams Act amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
applies to tender offers for equity securities of publicly-held entities.'

2. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1964), current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) & (e), n(d)-(f) (1986).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1986).
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The Williams Act was adopted to assist investors in making an
informed decision about whether to tender their shares when confronted with a cash tender offer.4 The Williams Act attempts to give
investors the time and information necessary to evaluate the terms of
a tender offer by imposing disclosure and substantive requirements
on tender offerors.
The Williams Act mandates that adequate disclosure of the offer
is given to shareholders, 5 that notice of the offer is given to target
management to afford management an opportunity to respond, 6 and
that shareholders are assured adequate time to decide whether to
accept the tender offer. 7 In seeking to insure shareholder protection,
the Williams Act was carefully tailored to avoid favoritism to either
the tender offeror or the management of the target company. 8 The
Williams Act was intended to assure a level playing field for management and bidder. 9 There is some perception that the Williams Act
tends to favor bidders. Its enactment clearly benefited both management and shareholders, however, in that it was detrimental to bidders
since the Williams Act put a halt to the quick, blitzkrieg offers and
panic selling that had previously existed.10
With only one exception, there has not been any serious objection
to the substantive provisions of the Williams Act since its enactment.1"
4. The Williams Act was designed to provide "full and fair disclosure for the
benefit of investors" in the context of both tender offers and certain non-tender
offer acquisitions of stock. 113 CoNo. REc. 24,664 (1967) (remarks of Senator
Williams).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1986).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1987).
8. The Senate Committee stated:
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of
regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making
the takeover bid. The bill is designed to require full and fair disclosure for
the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and
management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
S.Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
9. The Williams Act was intended to neither encourage tender offers nor to
provide incumbent management with a tool for obstructing them. "Congress was
indeed committed to a policy of neutrality in contests for control ... ." Piper v.
committed to a policy of neutrality in contests for control ... ." Piper v. Chris-Craft

Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
10. A blitzkrieg describes an unfriendly tender offer which involves no discussion with the respective target company prior to the announcement of the takeover
bid. Because these offers generally remained open for only minimal periods, they
were calculated to place management, as well as shareholders, in a highly pressured
situation.
11. The exception is H.R. 3618, introduced by Representative Doren of Cali-
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However, there has always been objection to some of its procedural
details and to its limited application. Numerous bills are pending to
effect changes.
B.

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

The other federal statute currently in effect which impacts on
takeovers is the Internal Revenue Code. Unlike the Williams Act, the
Internal Revenue Code may have a substantial adverse economic
impact which may deter, or accelerate, hostile tender offers. The
legitimacy and negative social impact of effecting policy through
taxation has been debated since the first attempts to do so. It should
be noted, however, that such attempts have frequently failed and,
indeed, have frequently resulted in consequences quite different from
what the legislature intended. Section 280G may be such an example.
It disallows deductions for "excessive" golden parachute payments.12
By prohibiting such deductions, the impact of such payments is
doubled and tends to make golden parachute payments a more potent
deterrent to takeovers, since management will make and receive the
payments, while the corporation suffers not only diminution from the
payment but also non-deductibility after the bidder has acquired it.
Newly enacted Section 5881 may also have a result which is the
opposite of Congress' intent. The purpose of Section 5881 is to
eliminate payments by the corporation to raiders in settlement of
tender offer attempts. 3 The payment, taxed excessively and nondeductible, forces the "greenmailer" to continue to hold its shares,
press on with the takeover, or sell to someone other than the target
at cost (at least insofar as the shares are concerned), thus keeping the
target in play and weakening it for acquisition by others. The net
result is no real loss to the greenmailer, but substantial management
vulnerability.
III. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND COMMENTS
Numerous bills have been introduced in the House and Senate to
amend the Williams Act provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
fornia on November 9, 1987, and styled as the Shareholders Rights Act of 1987,
which would repeal subsections (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Section 13 of the 1934 Act (15
U.S.C. 78m) and subsections (d), (e) and (f) of Section 14 of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C.
78n), thus eliminating the Section 13 report of acquisition and holdings provision
and the Section 14 tender offer provisions.
12. I.R.C. § 280G (1988).
13. I.R.C. § 5881 (West Supp. 1988). The Technical Amendment Bill of 1988,
H.R. 4333, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), seeks to eliminate the one way that the
target company had to avoid this trick bag, i.e., the sale of shares by the "greenmailer" to a "white knight" or other party friendly to the target.
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1934.' 4 Those that are essentially neutral would lower or close the
after sale window for reporting share acquisitions to the Securities

and Exchange Commission and to the target company. 5 By and large,

however, the proposals may be perceived as more favorable to target
management than to the bidder. For example, several proposals would

prohibit the bidder from making additional purchases of shares until
after a public announcement, a filing, or both. 6 Several proposals
would lower the report level from the current 5% . 7 Several proposals
would require that acquisitions in excess of a percentage of the

outstanding shares, ranging from 25% down to 10% in the various

proposals, be made solely pursuant to the tender offer provisions of
the Williams Act.' 8 There are proposals to extend the period that a
tender offer must remain open, ranging from 45 to 60 days,' 9 to
prohibit market sweeps for 30 calendar days following the termination
of a tender offer, 20 and to prohibit a tender offer by one who files a
Schedule 13D expressing an investment intent until six months after

filing an amendment expressing an intent to acquire control. 2' Some

proposals provide for civil penalties (one for civil actions,22 one for

14. S. 227, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 6, 1987), styled as the Tender Offer
Reform Act of 1987; S. 521, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 5, 1987), styled as the
Tender Offer Improvement Act of 1987; S. 678, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 6,
1987), styled as the Corporate Takeover.Reform Act of 1987; H.R. 1601, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 12, 1987), styled as the Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987;
H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 27, 1987), styled as the Tender Offer Reform
Act of 1987; S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 4, 1987), styled as the Tender
Offer Disclosure and FairnessAct of 1987; S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 4,
1987), styled as the Corporate Takeover and Insider Abuse Reform Act of 1987;
H.R. 3618, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 9, 1987), styled as the ShareholdersRights
Act of 1987.
Following the market break of October 19, 1987, many of the federal proposals
appear to have been put on the "back burner," while Congress assesses "defects"
in the market system. Hopefully, much of the proposed federal legislation will be
forgotten and never passed. To that end, the author believes that it is useful to
discuss the negative aspects of such proposals.
15. S. 1323, § 3(a); S. 1324, § 3(a); H.R. 2172, § 4(a); S. 227, § 2(a); S. 678,
§ 2; H.R. 1601, § 3(a); S. 521, § 2.
16. S. 1323, § 3(f); S. 1324, § 5; H.R. 2171, § 4.
17. S. 1324, § 3(a); S. 678, § 2; S. 521, § 2.
18. S. 1323, § 7(b); S. 1324, § 9(a); H.R. 2172, § 14; S. 678, § 3.
19. S. 1323, § 7(b); S. 1324, § 9(a); H.R. 2172, § 9; S. 227, § 4(a); S. 678, § 4;
S. 521, § 3(1).
20. S. 1324, § 9(a)(1), H.R. 2172, § 11.
21. S. 1323, § 5(a)(2); S. 1324, § 5.
22. S. 1324, § 13.
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SEC actions only23) for false statements in Schedules 13D. There are
proposals to require that Forms 13D and 14D disclose the employment
and community impact of the filers' plans.3' There are also proposals

for limiting the use of and, indeed, prohibiting junk bonds, 25 and
disallowing deductions for interest on loans to acquire companies. 26

There are also provisions that may be perceived as favorable to

bidders. These are prohibitions against golden parachutes27 and poison

pills,28 federal pre-emption of all state takeover laws 29 and the repeal
of the federal tender offer laws.30 However, these laws may in fact be

detrimental to bidders.
A.

DEFINITION OF "GROUP"

Some proposals seek to expand the definition of "group". 3' As

a consequence of this expanded definition, voters, competing bidders,
one person reacting to another, or persons with a common or parallel

goal may be deemed a "group" whose shareholdings may be aggre-

gated and, at least colorably, subject to the various requirements and
prohibitions of the Williams Act. This somewhat nebulous expansion
of the definition of "group" is coupled with threshold percentages of
as little as 2.5% of outstanding shares for initial filings and increases
of as little as 1% of outstanding shares for amendments, 32 immediate
filing'and public announcement requirements, 33 and penalties compounded daily.3 4 The potential consequence is that persons having no

intention of making a tender offer and who are unaware of filing
requirements, or prohibitions against acquiring more shares, may
23. H.R. 1601, § 4(b), insofar as it relates to community impact statements.
24. S. 1324, § 9(a)(2); H.R. 1601, § 4(a).
25. S. 1324, § 11.
26. H.R. 3545. However, this provision was not adopted. Accordingly, I.R.C.
§ 279 (1988) imposes the only current restrictions on deduction of interest to acquire
companies.
27. S. 1323, § 8; S. 1324, § 10; S. 227, § 4(a)(7).
28. S. 1323, § 8; S. 678, § 6.
29. S. 1323, § 12; S. 1324, § 14.
30. H.R. 3618.
31. H.R. 2172, § 4(b) by the parenthetical "whether or not organized"; S.
1323, § 5 by including in the definition one "acting in concert or in a coordinated

or consciously parallel manner . . . for the purpose of ... influencing the management or policies of an issuer"; S. 1324, § 5 defines as acting "in a consciously
parallel manner, without regard tothe existence of a contract or agreement."
32. S. 1324, § 4(b).
33. S. 1323, § 3(f); S. 1324, § 3(a)(2); H.R. 2172, § 4(a); S. 227, § 2(a).
34. S. 1323, § 6; S. 1324, § 13.
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inadvertently violate the laws, and thereby, be subject to a challenge
for what they deem, and by all appearances is, lawful conduct.
Expanding the definition of the term "group" aroused SEC
opposition, which argued that:
Existing Commission rules are sufficiently broad to address
arrangements or understandings that are not written or express. Rule 13d-5 covers those situations in which 2 or more
persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring,
holding, voting or disposing of securities. Knowingly parallel
conduct already constitutes evidence of an agreement under
section 13d. For example, the courts have held that the fact
that an investor knows that he is acting through his broker,
along with other clients of that broker, to form a block for
the benefit of the entire group, is evidence that all clients were
acting together."
Arbitrageurs, acting on the same market signs or information,
may come within the definition of a "group" and have their holdings
aggregated. Arbitrageurs are now more likely to be noticed because
of the proposed requirement to register with the Securities & Exchange
Commission. 36 Admittedly, some of the proposals do exclude certain
3
acquisitions. "
The general effect of these proposals is to tighten the Williams
Act provisions for timely disclosure and lower the threshold for such
disclosure, so that inadvertent violations by investors become more
likely. There is no good reason why a purchaser for investment who
crosses the 20, 3%, or even the 5% threshold should be required to
file a Schedule 13D immediately. Arguably, it might be better to
require the triggering event for filing to be the acquisition of stock
beyond a certain threshold for the purpose of ultimately acquiring
control and let those having only an investment intent file an annual
report on Schedule 13G when such information will be useful to the
35. S. Hrg. 100-183, Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeovers, Hearings before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
93 (June 25, 1987).
36. S. 1323, § 9.
37. S. 227, § 4(a)(7) excludes beneficial ownership by virtue or proxy solicitations, consents or authorizations, and involuntary acquisitions such as by gift, bequest
or inheritance. S. 227, § 4(a)(7) and S. 678, § 3 exclude issuer acquisitions. S. 678,
§ 3 excludes any transfers to an individual related by blood or marriage. S. 678 also
excludes transfer to ESOPS and provides for further exemptions as determined by
the SEC, thereby, presumably, continuing those exemptions now in existence.
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particular issuer, viz., when the Form 10-K information is being
assembled after the issuer's fiscal year end.
B. "CREEPING TENDER OFFERS"

Four proposals contain provisions designed to preclude "creeping
tender offers"."8 A so-called "creeping tender offer" is nothing more
than a purchase of shares at the market or a private purchase, in
excess of certain limits. Neither should be regulated merely because
of the ambition of the potential purchaser or the size of his purchases.
A private seller is fully protected by the negotiating process. The
market is protected by multi-level regulation, knowledge of the subject
company and the input of actual purchases and sales of shares in the
market. A tender offer is an extra-market proposal and therefore is
unaffected by these forces. Accordingly, these statutory proposals are
objectionable because they preclude a person from purchasing shares
at the market and in private transactions; ordinary and lawful acts
which are the same whether a few shares are being purchased or
many. Securities should be available to be bought and sold by anyone.
In the absence of such rights, free and open markets and freedom of
contract do not truly exist with respect to securities. Markets and
securities have a diminished value without free and unfettered trading.
Once a security has been put into the market place, no constituency
other than the shareholder has any legitimate claim to limit marketability. There should be no restraint on marketability or alienability
without adequate prior notice and equal application to all, without
regard to the number of shares accumulated by any person or group.
The only constraints should be with respect to fraudulent statements
and market manipulations.
C.

CHANGE OF INTENT

One of the more questionable provisions of proposed legislation
is Section 5(a) of S. 1323. Section 5(a) provides that a person who
38. S. 1324, § 11 prohibits agreements to acquire or acquisitions other than
pursuant to a tender offer complying with the statute and SEC rules if the purchaser
would become a more than 25% beneficial owner. S. 1324, § 7 provides for a 10%
threshold. It further provides that unless the tender is for 20076 or less, the tender
must be for all shares. S. 227, § 4 provides that no more than 2°76 can be acquired
within any 12 months after acquiring 20076 except pursuant to a tender offer complying
with the statute and SEC regulations. S. 678, § 3 provides for a 15% threshold. It
further provides that a tender offer seeking between 15% and 35076 must be open to
all holders; a tender offer seeking more than 3507 must be for all shares at the same
price to all within a six month period.
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files a Schedule 13D indicating a "solely for investment" purpose is
thereby precluded from acquiring any additional shares by tender
offer for 60 days.3 9 An amendment must be filed which indicates a
change of investment intent to acquiring or "influencing control" of
the issuer. S. 1324 has a similar provision With a six month prohibition
period.4 Since a person or a group may not acquire shares in excess
of the thresholds described previously (in the one bill as low as 1007o;
in another, 2% after the initial 20%), other than by tender offer, an
investor must disavow investment intent to be able to make additional
investments.
Perhaps the most articulate explanation of the problems presented
5(a) were contained in the ABA's submission to the Senate
Section
by
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. The ABA
submission commented on the combined adverse impact of the requirements of Section 13(d) and Section 5(a) of S. 1323:
S. 1323 requires 13D filers would also be required to specify
whether their purpose in acquiring shares is (i) to influence or
acquire control of the issuer or (ii) only for investment. If a
person specifies investment intent, such person may not acquire shares of the issuer by tender offer until six months
after the filing of an amendment disclosing that the purpose
of such filer is to influence or acquire control. This six month
prohibition [S. 1323 was amended at markup to reduce this
period to 60 days; however the ABA's criticism are still valid]
constitutes overkill. We fail to see how the public and shareholders are served by requiring a six month moratorium
because of a change of intent. In many cases 13D filers may
not know at the time of an initial filing whether their intent
is investment only. A filer may be uncertain or change his
mind because of changing conditions or otherwise. The law
should not preclude free choice. Many otherwise passive investors may elect to specify possible control intent in order to
avoid the six month delay should circumstances change and
the investor later desires to seek or influence control. This, in
turn, could be misleading to the market. If such a choice is
required, we should suggest an approach similar to that utilized
by the SEC in effecting changes from filing a 13G Statement
to filing a 13D Statement. Current provisions prohibit 13G
filers from voting, acquiring or disposing of shares for a ten
39. S. 1323, 5(a).
40. S. 1324, § 9(b).
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day period after they have a change of intent and file a 13D
Statement. We believe this is within the SEC's current rulemaking authority and, therefore, Congress need not deal with
41
this item specifically.
The obvious and perverse effect is that investors will be much
less likely to disclose a "solely for investment" intent, whatever their
true intent, thus undercutting the disclosure value of the provision.
The prudent investor may opt for flexibility rather than an accurate
statement of intent, since it is highly unlikely that a suit will be
brought for a false statement of intent to acquire for control. As a
consequence, we should expect the investment purpose Schedule 13D
to disappear.
D.

COMMUNITY IMPACT STATEMENTS

There are three proposals to require bidders to make community
impact statements. H.R. 1601 requires that the Schedule 13D disclose
any proposed change in the business or corporate structure that will
affect the community, management, labor organizations, employees,
compensation or benefits. 42 S.1324 requires the bidder to send the
issuer and the SEC a detailed impact statement within 48 hours after
the tender offer commences. 43 This statement must include an estimate
of the number of employment positions likely to be lost over a fiveyear period as well as the revenues each governmental entity is likely
to lose over that period. S. 521 requires information similar to that
required by S. 1324 to be included in any filing with respect to the
acquisition required to be filed under the Clayton Act, and the
Attorney General is required to immediately disclose such information
to the public."
The first question with respect to these disclosures is whether
they are relevant to the purposes of the legislation. The purpose of
the 1934 Act is to provide information about the issuer and its publicly
traded securities. The Clayton Act is intended to regulate competition.
The question then becomes of what relevance is community impact
information to these purposes? The Attorney General is not expected
to do anything relating to his charge under the Clayton Act with
41. S. Hrg. 100-183, Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeovers, Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
515-16 (June 25, 1987).
42. H.R. 1601, § 4.
43. S. 1324, § 9(a)(2).
44. S. 521, § 6.
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respect to information received. His sole purpose is to disseminate
the information to the public. What is the purpose? No one has the
right to act on this information other than the investor. The shareholder is to consider the information in making his decision whether
to buy or sell. Community impact information has little relevance to
the investment decision of a shareholder as such. This information
seems more useful to other constituents, but its usefulness is questionable because only the shareholders can decide the change of
ownership at the stage when Schedules 13D and 14D are being filed.
The shareholder's only concern as such is the current and future value
of his shares and its relation to the price being offered. Community
impact statements appeal, if at all, to concerns of the shareholder
other than those which relate to the federal securities laws.
Shareholders cannot be expected to protect anyone's interest other
than their own, especially if to do so would be detrimental to them.
Therefore, a community impact statement addressed to shareholders
may be an idle gesture. These interests must be protected in other
ways. However, the impact statement is about as far as anyone should
expect Congress to go because Congress has to cater to other constituents as well as to local communities and employees. Furthermore,
the evidence is far from clear that acquisitions adversely impact on
local and employment interests, let alone national interests. The local
community, employees and other constituents must protect themselves
in a timely manner. The community can creatively grant concessions
to make their community attractive to their important local businesses,
and can exact transition payments to cover the loss of their departure.
Employees can negotiate for severance payments sufficient to cover
anticipated periods of unemployment, retraining programs, and similar benefits. Such arrangements can be designed to assure that bidders

pay the full cost of the acquisition and that no single constituent
suffers the adverse consequences of an acquisition without appropriate
compensation. It should be noted, however, that each corporation,

its constituents, and its circumstances are different; it is best that they
tailor to their own needs rather than rely on the single, broad

application of the statutory mandate of legislation generalities.
Community impact statements may be intended to provide more
legitimacy to the board of director's consideration of interests of
outside constituents, interests other than the shareholders, as permitted under state corporate law. 4 Conceivably, they may also provide
45. For example, Section 8.85 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, which
provides that the board of directors may consider employees, suppliers, customers,

1988:293]

TAKEOVER LEGISLATION

a basis for litigation. Realistically, though, a false statement of intent
is unlikely to be chargeable even after a successful acquisition and it
is questionable whether anyone would have standing to sue.46
Therefore, it is difficult to see the utility of such statements unless
the government is going to enjoin or alter an acquisition. This would
be accomplished on the basis of variation from what was proposed
before the acquisition, after the acquisition had taken place. This, of
course, would be a disaster.
E.

ECONOMIC EVIDENCE

S. 1324 prohibits acquiring more than 20% of a company unless
the bidder makes a tender offer for all shares. 47 S. 678 requires the
same at the 35% threshold. 48 This is a substantial interference with
basic economic rights. It may require a bidder to acquire and pay for
more than he needs. It may also limit management, employees, and
other constituents from acquiring any significant interest in their own
company. Presumably, mandatory offers are intended to protect
shareholders who would be left after a limited tender offer from
losing marketability, Voting power, and, perhaps, dividend rights.
However, providing this protection may have substantial detrimental
side effects. The mandatory offer provision gives the successful bidder
no choice in whether to accept shares tendered by rival bidders. It
forces the bidder to accept treasury shares from the issuer, shares
held by subsidiaries, and converted shares, including those triggered
by poison pill provisions. In general, the mandatory offer provision
opens the bidder to costs which go far beyond what he is willing to
pay for the company, far beyond what was known and could be
anticipated by the bidder and far beyond the value of the company.
Congress has also proposed federal interference with the funding
of acquisitions. S. 1324 makes a tender offer unlawful if more than
25% of the acquisition price is to be provided from borrowings or
the issuance of any obligations or participations if it is reasonably
expected by the target that any of its assets, cash flow, earnings or
credit will be used to secure or service such borrowings, obligations
or participations. 49 Any pretense that this legislation is intended to
the community and all other pertinent factors in considering the best interests of the
corporation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (1985).
46. H.R. 1601, § 4 denies private litigants a private right of action for Form
13D impact statements.
47. S. 1324, § 9(a)(3)(A).

48. S. 678, § 3.

49. S. 1324, § 1l(a)(1).
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protect the banking system or prevent the de-equitization of America
must be dismissed in view of the exceptions for self tenders, friendly
tenders and ESOP purchases. Also, it seems highly improper to base
illegality of the tender offer on the reasonable expectation of the
target that it may directly or indirectly finance the acquisition. What
this anti-finance proposal appears to do is give bust-up acquirers a
substantial advantage over acquirers who intend to operate the target.
It would be very difficult to characterize the sale of components by
an acquirer to independent third parties as direct or indirect financing
of the acquisition. Such subsequent acquisitions, of course, would be
consensual so that the finance prohibition would not apply. The
legislation may not stop the operating acquirer either, depending on
how "indirect finance" is interpreted. It may just create multi-step
acquisitions, intermediary specialists, or brokers. Expansively interpreted, it could preclude funds acquired from the sale of participations
(such as partnership interests, beneficial interests, and common or
preferred stock) from being used by an acquirer for an unfriendly
acquisition. An expansive interpretation may also preclude integration
of operations after acquisition, although enforcement would be problematic.
S. 1324 would also prohibit a tender offer for cash unless the
amount needed were deposited in unrestricted or interest bearing
demand deposit bank accounts, or the acquirer had a legally enforceable unconditional and irrevocable commitment which is not contingent upon the success of the tender offer. ° One or a combination of
the two must be in place at the time of the tender offer announcement.
Such provisions appear to be unnecessary, even punitive. If a tender
offeror is ultimately unable to pay for tendered shares, the shares are
not acquired and suit may be brought by the shareholders and others
for damages. Such provisions require that assets be sold or mortgaged
prior to when the funds are needed, in order for the acquirer to
obtain an unconditional loan commitment. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that the kind of commitment required by the statute ever existed or
ever will. All commitments have conditions, purpose clauses and
contingencies. Furthermore, the provision that any person is given
standing to sue in a district court for an injunction permits officious
intermeddling by persons who have no interest other than blackmail.
The penalty for violation by the bidder is a civil penalty of not less
than 5% of the borrowings; by the lender, not less than l%. 1 There
50. Id. § ll(a)(2).
51. Id. § I1 (a)(4).
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is no indication who receives the penalty funds. Hopefully, Congress
did not intend to create bounty hunters.
S. 1324 provides an exception to the foregoing for any proposed
acquisition that the Federal Reserve Board determines to be positive
economically, and fair to the shareholders and creditors both of the
subject company and the acquirer.5 2 The board's decision is to be
53
rendered within 20 days; it is not reviewable.
The mechanics of this procedure would preclude its use. The
provision places at the federal level the initial decisions as to benefit
and fairness of the acquisition, which were at one time at the state
level, being made by the Secretaries of State, albeit the touchstone
here is financing. Since the financing prohibitions apply only to
$100,000,000 companies, it is unlikely that the Federal Reserve Board
will be inundated with exception requests. However, fairness issues
are beyond their usual scope; analysis of specific loans, commitments,
and alternatives seem too detailed for their attention. All in all, it
would seem more appropriate to leave financing to the lenders and
the borrowers and to avoid the intervention of government either
through legislation or administration.
F.

DEFENSIVE TACTICS

In apparent anticipation of the opportunities that the proposed
provisions and procedures afford the greenmailer and others for
manipulation, S. 1324 expands the definition of manipulation beyond
misrepresentation and nondisclosure. 4 Unfortunately, such expansions also expand uncertainty and litigation.
Several of the federal proposals prohibit the establishment of
gold parachutes during tender offers.5 5 This will encourage management to adopt this defense immediately. Labor unions are beginning
to press for substantial severance benefits for their members in the
event of an acquisition. These have been called "tin parachutes." The
coupling of golden and tin parachutes should make labor a powerful
and politically useful ally of management. As an adjunct, and to
alleviate employee dislocations, provisions could be made for immediate vesting, accelerated payout of pension and profit-sharing funds
and tapping into the bidders pension and profit-sharing funds to
compensate for any benefit shortfalls. Protection against termination
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. § 11(a)(3).
Id.
Id. § 7.
See S. 1323, § 8; S. 1324, § 10; §. 227, § 4.
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by the hostile acquirer should also be provided. These could be
fashioned after the poison pill plans currently in effect for shareholders. However, they would be more potent because their abrogation
could lead to massive strikes and suits to enforce them.
The debate as to whether poison pills are the ultimate management weapon against the tender offer or merely another obstacle may
continue even if any of the proposed legislation is adopted. The SEC
has expressed the former view, the courts the latter in upholding the
adoption of poison pills before a tender offer as a proper exercise of
business judgment. The courts' proviso is that the board will have a
duty to revisit the issue when faced with a tender offer. One of the
legislative proposals adopts this position by prohibiting the adoption
of a poison pill plan during a tender offer. Another adopts the SEC
position and prohibits the adoption of such plans. However, since the
prohibition would not be effective until the adoption of regulations
by the SEC within 180 days after enactment of the legislation, the net
effect of both proposals is to encourage immediate adoption of poison
pill plans.
Although there is no doubt that acquirers will continue to bring
pressure upon directors to rescind poison pills, they will also develop
other methods of dealing with them. Before they commence their
tender offers they should have the ability to adopt anti-poison pill
plans which nullify the plans, taking into account the plans in paying
their price for shares or structuring their offers to the shareholders to
effect a waiver of such rights. The rights acquired pursuant to poison
pill plans that are not given for any real value may be disposed of
6
similarly.1
Of the two types of defenses, parachutes and pills, parachutes
seem more promising than poison pills as they cannot be affected by
pressure on the board or by maneuvering with the shares or shareholders.
S. 678 prohibits a company from making any structural change
unless done pursuant to a contract in place prior to the public
announcement of a takeover bid or unless it is approved by a majority

56. See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986);
Rothschield Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 474 A.2d 133 (Del. Supr. 1984);
Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148 (Del. Ch. 1943); Hottenstein v. York Ice
Mach. Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1943); and Fed. United Corp. v. Havender, 11
A.2d 331 (Del. 1940), all to the effect that rights of preferred stockholders may be
modified or extinguished in a merger. Obviously, poison pills can be in no better
position than preferred stock in this regard.
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of the shareholders.17 Structural changes are described as the disposal
of any significant amount of assets, excluding those in the ordinary
course of business, the issuance or purchase of 5%o or more of its
stock, and anything reasonably likely to affect voting rights of any
class of stock, or anything else that the SEC determines should be
conditional upon obtaining shareholder approval.
As presently drafted, S. 678 is easily circumvented by preplaced
contracts which become operative upon the announcement of a tender
offer or some other triggering event. However, in the absence of such
contracts and without adequate exercise of proposed exemptive powers
by the SEC, this bill could be extremely disruptive of business. For
example, borrowings could be affected by an inability to mortgage
property or issue debentures because such activities could affect voting
rights or might be deemed to be a disposal of property. Stock
transactions with or for employees, a public offering of debt or stock,
or acquisitions could be prevented if the timing is wrong. The bill
also provides a basis for the SEC to get involved in establishing a
federal corporate law through regulations mandating shareholder
approval for certain corporate actions. Possibly worst of all, the bill
provides leverage for the prospective bidder on the eve of a "structural
change," to exact a price for not making a tender offer.
The Senate, through its latest revision of S. 1323 on September
30, 1987, has set aside for further study legislative proposals to curb
tender offer" defenses, with the exception of greenmail, which a
number of bills prohibit.
Greenmail is not only a tender offer defense but also an escape
for the bidder. The term is really nothing more than a pejorative for
a settlement. There is a suspicion that some tender offerors never
intend to acquire a company, but make the bid merely to run up the
stock and make a profit. In an attempt to prevent this, one proposal
is that all profits from any sale or disposition of shares by such
person within six months of the commencement of such person's
tender offer (less reasonable expenses) shall inure to the benefit of,
or be recoverable by, the target." This provision will dovetail with
the provisions of S. 1324 prohibiting investment purpose filers of
Schedule 13D from commencing a tender offering until six months
after filing a control purpose amendment. 9 In combination, they will
prevent a bidder from selling any shares for six months and prohibit
him from acquiring any shares for the same period.
57. S. 678, § 50)(1).
58. S. 1324, § 9(b).
59. S. 1324, § 5.
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Therefore, S. 1324 places a premium on having a firm intent to
seek control from the outset. An investment intent which matures
into an intent to seek control can be disastrous. A premium is also
placed on perseverance, since a bidder who surrenders runs the risk
that he will be found not to have had the requisite intent to seek
control. In addition, the target is placed in an awkward position
because, although it is a beneficiary of any profit and can negotiate
away such right thus nullifying the effect of the statute, it may, in
fact, not be able to negotiate effectively because it cannot eliminate
the possibility of a shareholder derivative suit to collect the profit.
Thus, under the statute, all parties may be stuck in a situation, for
up to six months, that no one wants and from which no one benefits.
Ironically, the situation is not as difficult if there are multiple bidders
and the sellout is to the successful bidder. The ultimate sole or
controlling shareholder of the company can negotiate a waiver or
repayment.
Various other greenmail provisions prohibit the subject company
60
from paying more than market price to the stock owners of 2.5016,
307',6 1 5076,62 or more of the stock which has been held for less than
six months from the date of acquisition, unless it is either approved
by a majority of the shareholders, or the same premium is offered to
all shareholders. Accordingly, greenmail will be stopped in that the
target will not be approached to make the greenmail payment. Rather,
the "greenmailer" will approach another bidder who can pay the
premium willingly. Therefore, management is substantially disadvantaged. A company that has successfully defeated one tender will be
set up for one or more subsequent onslaughts by acquirers who can
pick up large blocks from prior unsuccessful bidders. Increasing the
likelihood of this scenario are the proposed market sweep prohibitions
which preclude a tender offeror from purchasing shares during the
30-day period following termination of a tender offer. If there are no
successor bidders, the sweep can commence after 30 days, possibly at
bargain prices attributable to the termination. It appears that management is most likely to suffer from the proposed greenmail prohibitions. New Internal Revenue Code Section 5881 exacerbates this
situation for management by imposing a non-deductible 50076 tax on
63
greenmail gains for stock held less than two years.

60.
61.
62.
63.

S. 1324, § 10.
See S. 521, § 4; H.R. 2172, § 5(2); § 1323, § 8.
See S. 227, § 4(a)(7); H.R. 1601, § 6.
I.R.C. § 5881 (West Supp. 1988).

1988:293]

G.

TAKEOVER LEGISLA TION

PROPOSALS TO PREEMPT STATE LAW

Congress has been considering whether to preempt state law.
64
Senate Bills 1323 and 1324 would add a section 36 to the 1934 Act,
which provides that the internal affairs of a corporation shall be
subject to the laws of the State where organized except where compliance with the filing, disclosure, procedural or anti-fraud requirements of Sections 13 and 14 of the 1934 Act would be precluded by
such state laws. 65
Section 36 would maximize the authority of individual states. It
would minimize the reach of the Williams Act and restrict the extent
to which uniform federal regulation would govern the interstate
market for tender offers and regulate the conduct of contests for
corporate control. The major focus of authority over tender offer
activity would shift to the state legislatures and federal regulation
would take a secondary role in the conduct of contests for corporate
control.
Section 36 would change the test for whether the Williams Act
preempts state law from "conflict with" to "preclude compliance."
None of the states statutes would currently preclude compliance by
the participants with the Williams Act. In fact, it is submitted that
the Illinois statute, declared unconstitutional under the supremacy
clause in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,6 would not have "precluded compliance" with the Williams Act and thus would have been valid.
Section 36 would also eliminate any concerns that Delawareans
might have that incorporation alone is not a sufficient nexus under
64. See S. 1323, § 12; S. 1324, § 14.
65. Role of State Law
Sec. 36. The congress declares that the internal affairs of governance of
corporations shall be subject to regulation by the laws of the State under
which such corporation is organized. Nothing contained in section 13 or 14
of this title, or any rules or regulations thereunder, shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State regulation the
internal affairs of governance or contests for control of any corporation
organized under its laws, except where compliance with such law would

Id.

preclude compliance with the filing, disclosure, procedural, or antifraud
requirements of sections 13 and 14 of this title. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this section, nothing contained in sections 13 or 14 of this title
or the rules and regulations thereunder shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law or regulation limited to the regulation of a
banking, insurance, or similar State-regulated corporations or holding companies.
66. 457 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1982).
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the CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America67 decision to sustain
the constitutionality of anti-takeover legislation. It would also nullify
totally illegitimate state laws, such as California's, 6 which purport to
control the internal affairs of certain foreign corporations as well as
those portions of anti-takeover laws which purport to apply to foreign
corporations.
The committee revision of S. 1323 dated September 30, 1987 does
not include Section 36. This decision signals the committee's unwillingness to expand the scope of anti-takeover authority at the expense
of federal jurisdiction. Section 36 would effectively eliminate the
Williams Act as the regulatory scheme for takeover activity because
states would be empowered to adopt restrictions far more burdensome
than those imposed by the Williams Act. The rapid pace with which
state anti-takeover statutes have recently been adopted, and the vigor
with which states are now seeking to craft new and more aggressive
anti-takeover techniques that test the limits of the law demonstrate
the willingness with which the states would accept an invitation to
replace the Williams Act with a tangled net of anti-takeover provisions.
SEC Chairman Ruder has urged Congress to enact legislation
which would permit the SEC to preempt state law on a selective basis
where it interferes with national markets. 69 This appears to be a more
rational approach to the problem. Depending upon the mechanics, it
could work.
IV.

-STATE LEGISLATION

At the state level there-are three major types of state takeover
legislation: 1) "fair price", examples of which are found in the
Maryland 70 and Illinois71 statutes; 2) "control share", examples of
which are found in the Ohio 72 and the Indiana 3 statutes; and 3) "asset
freeze", of which the New York 74 and New Jersey 75 statutes are
examples. Delaware 76 has just adopted a watered-down "freeze"
67. 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651-52 (1987).
68. CAL. CoRu'. CODE § 2115 (West Supp. 1988).

69. See Ruder Warns Against Anti-Takeover Statutes, Chicago Daily Law

Bull., Oct. 8, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
70. MD. CoRps. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-603 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (1985).
72. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985).
73. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987).
74. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986).
75. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:IOA-I to 14A:10A-6 (West Supp. 1987).
76. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).
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statute. In addition, Pennsylvania 77 has a provision which requires
that persons acquiring 20% or more of the shares of a Pennsylvania
corporation buy out the remaining shareholders at a fair price. And,
Wisconsin 78 has a statute that modifies the voting rights of any
shareholders by capping the voting power of 20% shareholders at that
level and permitting them to exercise only 20076 of the voting power
of any shares (including convertible securities, options and warrants)
past that threshold.
A.

FAIR PRICE LEGISLATION

The fair price type of antitakeover legislation has been adopted
in similar form in Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. 79 Fair price statutes
address the narrow problem of "front-end loaded two-tier tender

offers." The tactic has been to tender for a controlling block of stock
and then threaten to "squeeze-out" in a merger the remaining shareholders at a lower price or for less attractive consideration. Shareholders are forced to tender into the offer out of fear that, if they do
not, the acquiring person will then force these objecting, nontendering

shareholders out of the company at the lower price or for the less

desirable form of consideration. The fair price type statutes require

that an acquiring person has to offer the same amount and form of

consideration in the merger, or other action, as they did in acquiring

their earlier control block shares.

In general, these statutes do not "directly" affect the acquisition
of shares. The effect is "indirect," because unless the acquisition of

shares beyond a stated level (usually 10%) is approved by the board
of directors beforehand, no "extraordinary action," such as a merger,

77. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
78. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(9) (West Supp. 1987).
79. See Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to 33-374c (West
1987); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.108 j(West Supp. 1988); Georgia, GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to 14-2-235 (Supp. 1987); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para.
7.85 (1985); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396 to 271A.398 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:131 to 12:134
(West Supp. 1988); Maryland, MD. CORPS & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-603
(1985 & Supp. 1987); Michigan, MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1776 to 45.1784
(West Supp. 1987); Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to 79-25-7 (Supp. 1987);
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to 55-79 (Supp. 1987); Pennsylvania, PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1987); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-725 to 13.1-728 (1985); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425
(Supp. 1988); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp. 1987).
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sale of assets, or recapitalization, may be effected. This is true unless
the action is either approved by a dual affirmative supermajority vote
of all shareholders (usually 80%) and of all "disinterested shareholders" (usually 2/3rds) or the shareholders receive a "fair price." Fair
price is usually defined as the higher of the highest price paid by the
acquirer within a period (usually two years) prior to the first announcement of the proposed extraordinary corporate action or in the
transaction by which the acquirer became an interested shareholder,
or the market price on the first trading day after either announcement
of the extraordinary corporate action or the acquirer becoming an
interested shareholder. Basically, these statutes make the minority a
shareholders' controlling majority with respect to extraordinary corporate transactions and set the price at which the minority shareholders may be bought out.
Under the normal fair price type statute, unlike the Pennsylvania
version which compels a 20% or more acquirer to purchase all shares,
the acquirer need not deal with the minority shareholders as long as
the acquirer can avoid extraordinary corporate transactions. These
fair price statutes compel only the acquirer planning to take any
extraordinary corporate action to buy out all remaining shareholders.
Otherwise, under the Illinois law, 0 for example, a single remaining
shareholder could delay any disposition which, singularly or in series,
amounts to as little as 10% of the corporation's net worth and could
prevent the issuance of any security, including equity of a different
class or a debt instrument, to interested shareholders, affiliates or
associates. Therefore, practically speaking, there may not be a significant distinction between the Pennsylvania mandate 8' and the normal
fair price statute, except in that the acquirer may pick his time rather
than have the statute do it for him.
Theoretically, a fair price statute does not affect the acquirer
who intends to operate the company. Practically, however, since the
"fair price" and supermajority provisions are perpetual, acquirers
may be expected to try to eliminate minority shareholders as soon as
possible to avoid restrictions on future transactions which could
hamper the progress of the company. The issue is thus raised as to
whether "fair price" provisions should be perpetuated beyond the
shareholders who held their shares during the acquisition period?
Any acquisition by any subsequent acquirer, for more than 10%,
or other 10% shareholder will affect the "fair price" which the
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (1985).
81. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
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original acquirer, as an affiliate or associate of each 10% or more
owner, must pay the minority. For example, a subsequent or other
more than 10% owner could sell one share at triple the "fair price"
and thereby triple any other interested shareholder's cost of buying
out the minority shareholders. Neither the company nor the shareholders are likely to know the new "fair price" under these circumstances. It should be questioned whether a sale at the lower price
makes the sale unlawful, or even subject to rescission?
On the other hand, the statute may be avoided if the new class
of acquirer mentioned earlier, the acquisition broker, is the initial
acquirer. He can effect a series of selloffs to third parties, who are
not interested shareholders, without complying with the statute, since
the statute applies only to extraordinary corporate transactions with
any interested shareholder, or any affiliate or associate, other than
the company or its subsidiaries.8 2 Furthermore, if there are no group
concepts in the statute, initial acquisition by persons each acquiring
less than the percentage which makes one an interested shareholder
can effect a second step at any price without violating the fair price
provisions. Presumably, an initial acquirer can sell off to other group
members and accomplish the same end, subsequently effecting a
merger which provides an appraised value for dissenters rather than
a "fair price" value for minority shareholders. In addition, since the
fair price statute is automatic only as to 1934 Act companies, a
company which gets down to 300 or fewer shareholders in the course
of the tender offer may be able to terminate its '34 Act registration
and have an "automatic opt-out" without obtaining the 80% and
majority disinterested shareholder votes otherwise required. 8 3 There
seems to be little stopping an acquisition broker who is funded by
one or more persons ultimately interested in acquiring who is funded
by one or more persons ultimately interested in acquiring companies,
or portions thereof, from creating an "automatic opt-out" situation.
Therefore, the "fair price" statute, while appearing to favor the
acquirer who intends to operate the company and discriminate against
the "bust-up artist" may, in fact, do the opposite. If this is true, one
of the purposes for which such statutes were adopted, the protection

82. The pre-takeover arrangement between Campeau Corp. and May Department Stores for the purchase of certain Federated Department Stores assets is a
prototype. Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1988, at 7, col. 1; Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1988, at 4,
col. 3.
83. This loophole is generally available. Delaware has closed it. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(4) (Supp. 1988).
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* of local businesses and local communities from damage by outsiders,
may be circumvented.
The fair price statutes contain several provisions which are intended to assure that shareholders are treated just as they were before
the acquirer crossed the interested shareholder threshold with regard
to dividends. These statutes also contain a provision intended to
discourage an interested shareholder from acquiring shares in manners
other than the single transaction which resulted in the interested
shareholder becoming such. Both provisions may be used by incumbent management to sabotage any efforts by the interested shareholder
to satisfy the fair price provisions. The board of directors needs
merely to authorize the payment of a regular preferred share dividend,
to reduce the annual common share dividend rate or to issue a stock
dividend which includes the interested shareholder. However, if twothirds of the disinterested directors vote in favor of such actions, they
will not sabotage the acquirer's fair price compliance. Accordingly, if
an entire board is disinterested, that is, none of the directors are
associates of any interested shareholders, only a majority of them
need vote in favor of these actions. This conduct may be justifiable
under the business judgment rule since it puts the minority and
disinterested shareholders in a position to possibly obtain better than
"fair price" in exchange for their favorable vote for any subsequent
extraordinary transaction.
Maryland permits the interested shareholder, who does not vote
for the action and urges the board to reverse its actions, to avoid
these consequences. This may lead to evidentiary disputes. A better
remedy would be to let the interested shareholder pay the difference
after gaining real control of the company or at the time of the
extraordinary corporate transaction by which the minority is eliminated. Otherwise, the minority shareholders may suffer from a loss
of dividends and also from a loss of a buy-out transaction at "fair
price."
The required manner of acquiring shares, viz., the transaction by
which one becomes an interested shareholder, precludes one from
acquiring shares except all at once. Only this way may fair price
provisions be satisfied and the supermajority provisions be avoided.
This, in turn, forces the acquirer to make a tender offer before he
reaches the interested shareholder threshold. It also precludes negotiated purchases from unsuccessful bidders, any other shareholder, and
market sweeps.
As a consequence, the acquirer may not qualify for the "fair
price" escape unless he is very careful. Even then his bona fide
compliance may be sabotaged. As a consequence, the corporate
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landscape in these states could become strewn with handicapped,
inflexible companies unable to effect extraordinary transactions of
benefit to all. They would also be unable to reward officers with
stock or provide them with stock option incentives. The minority
shareholders are likely to be adversely impacted by a loss of liquidity
and will have no escape via the interested shareholder or the market,
which probably will cease to exist.
On the other hand, it is possible to structure second step mergers
to get around these problems. The trick is not to merge with affiliates
or associate entities and not to become affiliated or associated as a
result of the merger. In this situation, as well as in the all-cash
dissolution, neither the fair price nor the supermajority provisions
will apply. This escape is particularly suitable for the acquisition
broker.
B.

ASSET FREEZE LEGISLATION

The asset freeze type of anti-takeover legislation has been adopted
in Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New York and Washington.1 4 Delaware and Pennsylvania have also
just adopted such legislation, while Illinois has such legislation pending. 5 The freeze-out fair price statutes focus on not only the twotiered problem addressed by the fair price statutes addressed above,
but also various types of "self-dealing" by a controlling shareholder,
especially extreme leveraging of the assets of the target company.
These statutes have a "fair price" component and are therefore
subject to the pitfalls and loopholes discussed above with respect to
the fair price type statutes. In addition, each has a five-year freeze
period, except Delaware which has a three-year freeze period,8 6 prohibiting squeeze-out mergers and self-dealing transactions with an
interested shareholder, and permitting them thereafter only if certain
conditions are satisfied. The interested shareholder threshold is 10076,
84. See Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1221 to 10-1223 (Supp. 1987);
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43 (West Supp. 1987); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271A.397 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.673 (West Supp. 1988); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp.
1988); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:10A-I to 14A:IOA-6 (West Supp. 1987);
New York, N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986); Washington, WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1988).
85. Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN tit. 15, § 1911 (Purdon Supp. 1988); H.B. 3865 has been tabled by the Illinois
House Judiciary I Committee.
86. Id. § 203(a).
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except in Missouri and New York which have 20% thresholds.8 7 These
statutes not only eliminate the possibility of a business combination
during the freeze period, but also probably eliminate any possibility
of a business combination if the interested shareholders do not
consent. Thus, acquirors can still obtain control over the target
company and oust management, but they cannot force the target to
absorb their acquisition debt.
As with the "fair price" provision, the "freeze" provision will
not apply if the second stage business combination is with a person
who is not an interested shareholder, and is not and will not thereafter
become an affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder. Again
this permits takeovers of companies by persons who do not intend to
run them and permits such persons to direct the company or portions
of the company to those who will run them. Thus, a pattern of
acquisition by a broker or bust-up artist who then sells in a second
stage to operators may emerge as a way around this type of legislation.
C.

CONTROL SHARE LEGISLATION

The control share type of antitakeover legislation avoids the
major loopholes in the "fair price" and "freeze" types of legislation.
Control share acquisition statutes are designed to ensure that shareholders acting as a group can make collective decisions regarding a
change of control. Basically, the control share type statute denies
voting rights to control shares until the disinterested shareholders vote
to grant such rights. By eliminating the rights of the interested
shareholders to vote their control shares, the bust-up artist's second
stage capability of circumventing provisions prohibiting sales of assets
and dealings with non-affiliates and non-associates is eliminated. This
type of legislation has been adopted in Arizona, Florida, Hawaii,
Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma and Wisconsin; Illinois has such
legislation pending.88 It should be noted that Ohio's control share
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87. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459(10)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP.

§ 912(10)(A)(i) (McKinney 1986).

88. See Arizona, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1211 to 10-1217 (Supp. 1987);
Florida, FiA. STAT. ANN. § 607.109 (West Supp. 1988); Hawaii, HAW. REv. STAT.
§§ 416-171 to 416-172 (1985); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987);
Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135 to 12:140.2 (West Supp. 1987); Massa-

chusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 10C, §§ I to 13 (West Supp. 1987); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West Supp. 1988); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 78.376 to 78.3793 (1985
& Supp. 1987); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to 55-98 (Supp. 1987);
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statute is different in that it precludes the purchase of shares until the
disinterested shareholders vote for it.89

From the perspective of target management, however, the control
share type of legislation may create a larger loophole because it
appears to eliminate the role of the board of directors. The board's
sole function under a control share statute is to call a meeting of the
shareholders to permit them to consider whether control shares should
have voting rights. It should, however, be recognized that the board
continues to have general obligations and duties to supervise and
manage the operations of the company. The board continues to have
the right and the duty to evaluate the benefits and detriments of the
share acquisition to the various constituents the board is charged with
protecting, the vote issue being separate from the takeover issue. Also,
with respect to the vote issue itself, the board should have the right
and the duty to make sure that the bona fide requirements of the
proposal to acquire shares have been met, particularly if the control
share acquisition has not taken place, 90 to coordinate competing bids,
and to determine what, if any, other issues should be submitted to a
vote at the meeting. In the exercise of its business judgment, the
board should be able to determine, albeit within narrow limits,
whether the vote issue should go to the shareholders. Otherwise, any
number of persons with any number of motivations and intentions
other than the acquisition of control shares could, without any, or
limited, share ownership or financing, cause the company to incur
the burdens of multiple special meetings, and cause the significant
disruption of the operations of the company.
If the board refuses to call a shareholders meeting, the acquiring
shareholder cannot do so even if he has acquired the required percentage under corporation law (usually 20%) which would normally
§ 1701.831 (Page 1985); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 1145 to 1155 (West Supp. 1988); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.25(9)
(West Supp. 1987); Illinois H.B. 2901, H. B. 2975 and H.B. 3008 are nearly identical
clones of the Indiana Chapter. H.B. 2901 is bottled up in the House Rules Committee
while the others have been tabled by the House Judiciary I Committee.
89. Omo Rzv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(E)(2) (Page 1985).
90. Arizona, Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1214 (Supp. 1987), and Minnesota
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 subd. 4 (West Supp. 1988), provide that the meeting
requirement is not triggered unless definitive financing arrangements are in place.
According to the commentary to subsection 5(a) of the exposure draft of the
Model Control Share Act, infra, the voting mechanism is not triggered unless shares
are acquired. However, the exposure draft language does not support such a conclusion and, in any event, up to 20% of the voting power could be acquired without
loss of vote. Therefore, it is unlikely that the vote mechanism would be triggered.
Ohio, Omo REv. CODE ANN.
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permit shareholders to call a meeting. The reason for this is that an
acquirer is an interested shareholder and is therefore not entitled to
vote at the meeting on the issue. A person without the right to vote
on the issue is without the power to call the meeting at which the
issue is to be voted.
A court may view any board action, other than calling the special
shareholders meeting, as interfering with the right of the shareholders
to decide the vote issue and compel the calling of the meeting. On
the other hand, the court may provide a drawn out forum for airing
the board's right to exercise its business judgment and the manner in
which it has or may do so.
It is unclear what is to be specifically voted on by the shareholders. Although there are three categories of control which the acquiring
person may designate as the limit of his aspirations, there is no
requirement that the shareholders accord full voting rights as to all
shares acquired or to be acquired in the designated category. Presumably, the acquirer would cure this problem by making his acquisition
contingent upon approval of full voting rights for all shares acquired
and to be acquired. Otherwise, the shareholders may vote in favor of
the granting of voting rights to an acquirer, but in such a way that
he is essentially disenfranchised; for example, by giving a one-fifth
share voting right for each share or by granting voting rights to only
one-tenth of the acquirer's shares. Since this does not accord full
voting rights to the acquiring shareholder, the acquirer's control shares
become subject to redemption by the company at fair value as
determined by the company. This could be very unfair. If fair value
is determined to be book value, the acquirer will probably suffer a
substantial loss.
If the acquiring person is accorded full voting rights and "has
acquired control shares with a majority or more of all voting power,"
all other shareholders acquire dissenters rights at fair value, which is
defined as being not less than the highest price paid by the acquiring
person in the acquisition. This may compel the acquirer to both obtain
and pay for more shares than he bargained.
Although the statute makes reference to groups, it defines control
shares and control share acquisitions in terms of a single person.
Hence there is a potential for simple avoidance of the statute by each
person staying below the share acquisition threshold.
The statutes bring within their grasp a number of ordinary
transactions which do not constitute a change in control. Proxy
solicitation for the annual election of directors as well as intrafamily
transfers for estate planning purposes appear to be control share
acquisitions which would cause presumably unintended disenfranchise-
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ments. Furthermore, it would appear that the disenfranchisement is
of shares rather than of persons, except for the initial vote with
respect thereto. Accordingly, it would appear that disenfranchised
shares continue to be disenfranchised in the hands of the transferee
although the transferee may have owned, and, as a result of the
transfer, own far less shares than the number required otherwise to
constitute them control shares. If only those shares acquired by the
transferor in a control share acquisition or only those acquired in the
control share acquisition which are in excess of the threshold are
disenfranchised, how are they traced to the transferee as franchised
or disenfranchised shares? Shares which have been previously franchised should be disenfranchised if acquired subsequently in a control
share acquisition. However, that is not the case if the transfer is made
in good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing the statute
unless the acquisition results in a higher control level than authorized.
Tremendous tracing difficulties will be created if there are sales by
the control shareholder between the time the control share threshold
is crossed and the actual shareholder vote takes place to determine
whether control shares can vote. The best answer to these problems
is to reference disenfranchisement to the person rather than to the
stock. It should be noted, however, that this may cause constitutional
problems.
Disenfranchisement of a control share acquirer's shares poses a
far more serious impediment to him than does a prohibition on
mergers and self-dealing transactions seen in the asset freeze legislation. Depending on the particular state corporation law, this could
result in the inability of the shareholders to elect directors and the
perpetuation of the existing board in office ad infinitum. For example,
in Illinois, a quorum of those entitled to vote must be at least onethird of the total shares outstanding. At least a majority of those
shares represented at the meeting and entitled to vote is required to
elect a director. Accordingly, if more than the particular quorum is
disabled, no directors can be elected. Even getting a quorum could
be a problem.
Finally, the control share type of statute will be pre-empted by
federal law to the extent that one share, one vote legislation is adopted
by Congress. 9' New York Stock Exchange listed companies will face
91. H.R. 2172, § 3(a) would merely provide that brokers and dealers cannot
trade such stock which, presumably would force all stock into the hands of offmarket, unregistered bidders, i.e., the "raider." The SEC's proposed one shareone vote rule, Rule 19c-4, would prohibit security exchanges and the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. from listing any domestic issuer that nullifies,
restricts or disparately reduces voting rights.
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the dilemma of opting out of control share protection or being
delisted. The board of directors of such companies almost certainly
must opt-out to avoid personal liability to their shareholders.
D.

PERSPECTIVES ON STATE LEGISLATION

Arguably, target management which is determined to remain
independent, whether for its own or the corporation's benefit, should
favor the "asset freeze" statute, but not the other types of state
legislation. The "freeze" statute makes restructuring, financing, and
using the assets of the target very burdensome, if not impossible, for
the acquirer. At the same time, target management which is determined to obtain the best price for its shareholders should favor the
"asset freeze" statute over the "fair price" statute because the
"freeze" statute forces the acquirer to negotiate with the board.
However, such management may also favor the "fair price" statute
because the only alternative to negotiating with management is to
offer a fair price, as defined, to all shareholders. Such management
would disfavor the "control share" statute because it removes the
decision-making power from the board and gives that power almost
immediately to the disinterested shareholders. Target management
which does not have a sufficient stake in the decision, for example, a
board composed of a majority of outside directors who are fearful of
personal liability, would favor the "control share" statute because it
can relieve them of the burden of decision.
The "asset freeze" statute should be disfavored by shareholders
because it is the most likely to preclude a tender offer. However, the
"freeze" statute has the greatest potential for negotiation of the best
price by the board of directors. In the absence of other bids, the
"fair price" statute is least likely to generate the best price, since it
merely requires a price floor based on the prior market. Its modest
goal is to assure that all shareholders receive equivalent treatment.
The bidder will disfavor the "asset freeze" statute, will favor the
"fair price" statute, yet will find the "control share" statute to be
the most preferable. Under the "freeze" statute the board of directors
have absolute power, subject to a challenge of its business judgment;
under the "control share" statute and the "fair price" statute, the
board is more circumscribed.
V.

PROPOSED STATE MODEL ACT

The American Bar Association and the North American Securities
Administrator's Association have formed a joint committee to prom-
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ulgate a model act. 92 Primarily because it has been held constitutional,
they have focused on the control share form of takeover legislation.
They have prepared a draft model act which purports to clarify the
ambiguities and resolve the problems of this type of takeover legislation. They do not appear to have done so. Indeed, their commentary
is inconsistent with their statutory proposal.
It is not an improvement over the control share statutes to provide
that only the shares having voting power above a certain level lose
their voting power. Standing alone, no share has such power. It is
only when shares are aggregated that they have such power. To
accomplish what the model act drafters intended, one would have to
key to the acquirer and disenfranchised shares owned by him in excess
of the threshold. As it stands, the proposal should generate much
litigation as to what is a controlled share and what is a controlled
share acquisition. Since the model act introduces group acquisition
concepts management may become inadvertently disenfranchised. This
could affect the validity of all subsequent corporate action. 93 The
result may be that a control share enfranchisement vote will be taken
at each annual meeting as a safety measure. (Indeed, the draft model
act so provides.) The draft model act also does away with the previous
approval exclusion so that enfranchised shares become disenfranchised
upon acquisition by a person or group that crosses the control share
threshold. The underlying theory is that such shares automatically
lose their disability when transferred to a less than threshold owner.
Certainly this should be the case, but it is not clearly outlined in the
enacted statutes or the draft model act.
In attempting to provide a proxy mechanism for the meeting at
which control share voting is determined, the draft model act defines
"interested shares" so that persons holding "interested shares" may
solicit proxies from shareholders, other than those who gave the
"interested shares" their quality as such, without also turning such
proxied shares into "interested shares."94 However, the language by
which the draft model act does so may also support the converse, the
voting of otherwise "interested shares" pursuant to proxies given to
disinterested shareholders by the interested shareholders.
92.

MODEL STATE CONTROL SHARE ACT

(Final Draft, Mar. 29, 1988) [hereinafter

MSCSA].
93. Indeed, if the company has opted-out of the control share provisions,
Section 6 of the exposure draft would require management to offer to acquire all
shares if it makes any acquisition of shares during the preceding 12 months. MSCSA

§ 6.

94. Id. § 3(e)(3)(K).
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The draft model act also requires that the solicitation of proxies
for the enfranchisement meeting must be separate from the solicitation
of shares in the tender offer. 9 One must recognize that price and vote
are tied together and this seems to be an attempt to untie them.
Whatever the mechanics, the issues are tied. No acquirer will purchase
shares without assurance of acquiring the votes implicit in the ownership of those shares. Each purchase will be contingent upon getting
those votes. The votes will be bought at the time that the shares are
bought. That is one of the basic economic realities and nothing in
any statute will alter it.
The draft model act does make clear that those shares which are
below the 2007o level are not disenfranchised 96 (except insofar as they
are "interested shares" for purposes of the enfranchisement vote) and
that disenfranchisement does not survive a transfer to a person who
is not making a control share acquisition, "making explicit what
probably is evident anyway."
Most importantly, the draft model act does away with disenfranchisement three years after the date of the disenfranchisement vote
because permanent disenfranchisement is "inequitable and confiscatory." 97 However, the commentary indicates that a consensus could
not be reached on this issue. The proposed model act also provides
that a new vote be taken at any subsequent shareholder's meeting, if
required by the acquiring person, and that, in any event, a new vote
be taken at each subsequent annual meeting. 9
The draft model act attempts to deal with competing control
share acquisitions. It provides that a vote to enfranchise may be
nullified by a subsequent vote to enfranchise with respect to a
competing control share acquisition." Not only may this constitute a
taking by state action without due process, but it may also preclude
compliance with the Williams Act, thereby rendering the entire model
act unconstitutional. Making the last acquisition valid rather than the
first appears to interfere with the decision of each shareholder as to
whom he will sell his shares. It may also "conflict" or "preclude
compliance" with the Williams Act because the process cannot be
completed within the 60-day period after which the shareholders may
withdraw their stock from the tender. Furthermore, interference with
the Williams Act is highly likely because of the required compliance
95. Id. § 4(b).
96. Id. § 4(c).
97. Id. § 4(d).

98. Id. § 5(f).

99. Id.§ 5(h).
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with the federal proxy rules which cannot be accomplished within the
60 day time frame.
VI.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

The constitutionality of the "fair price" type statute has not yet
been passed upon. The "control share" type statute has been declared
constitutional in the CTS case, without addressing the significant due
process and equal protection issues or the potential for complete
disablement of the shareholders to run their company. °° The Supreme
Court merely held that the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter
did not violate the Commerce Clause' 0 1 and that it was not preempted
by the Williams Act. 0 2 However, the Ohio version of "control share"
legislation was declared unconstitutional. °0 Since prior approval for
the acquisition of shares is involved, it would appear that interstate
commerce is more directly and adversely affected by the Ohio statute
than the Supreme Court felt was the case under the Indiana chapter
with the regulation of internal corporate affairs such as voting. A
purchase is commerce; a vote is an internal affair; albeit one that.
should be entitled to due process and equal protection.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that control
share statutes are constitutional, the issue remains under the various
state constitutions. Some states, such as Illinois, may have special
constitutional hurdles. In Illinois, under the 1870 Constitution, each
stockholder was required to be given the right of cumulative voting
in the election of directors. This right was preserved for corporations
pre-existing the effective date of the 1970 Constitution on July 1,
1971. In Roanoke Agency, Inc. v. Edgar,'°4 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that shareholders of pre-1971 corporations could alter or eliminate these voting rights only by unanimous consent of all shareholders.
Accordingly, at least as to pre-1971 corporations, control share would
be unconstitutional unless an exception were carved out for the
election of directors.
The constitutionality of the freeze type statute has been addressed
in BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc.,' °5 RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley
100. CTS, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
101. Id. at 1648-52.
102. Id. at 1644-48.
103. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated
sub nom., Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987). The Supreme
Court has vacated the judgment and remanded the case in light of the holding in the
CTS case.
104. 101 Ill. 2d 315, 461 N.E.2d 1365 (1984).
105. Civil Action No. 88-130-MMS (D. Del. April 1, 1988).
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Continental, Inc. 106 and R TE Corp v. Mark IV Industries, Inc. °7
In BNS, while conceding Section 203's pro-management tilt and
that the possibility of consummating a hostile tender offer might well
be illusory, Judge Schwartz deffered to to the Delaware Legislature's
judgment in deciding that the statute is probably not pre-empted by
the Williams Act. Likewise, in Staley, Judge Roth declined to rule
that Section 203 was probably unconstitutional based merely upon
the argument and statistical facts presented in support of a motion
for preliminary injunction. Judge Roth's analysis is quite surprising.
She employs statistical analysis to determine that one cannot yet tell
whether hostile offers have a meaningful opportunity for success under
Section 203, asserts that constitutionality does not depend on an
application to any one corporation, and therefore concludes that the
Supremacy Clause is not violated by Section 203. She employs a
platitudinous analysis to determine that interstate commerce is not
excessively burdened when compared to the the local benefits of
Section 203. One would expect the analytical tools to be employed
the other way around, particularly when it is so easily determined
that most shareholders and most assets of Delaware corporations are
not located in Delaware. It is inconceivable that local benefit can
outweigh the burden on interstate commerce given Delaware's preeminence as a corporate lawgiver and its insignificance in all other
respects.
RTE Corp. held the freeze type statute unconstitutional under
the Supremacy Clause because it denies the investor choice mandated
by the Williams Act and gives corporate management a virtual veto
power over the outcome of tender offer contests.
While the freeze type statute does not appear to directly conflict
with the Williams Act, it may have other constitutional infirmities.
The draftsmen hoped it would work .as a legitimate regulation of
internal corporate affairs, but there can be no question that the
"freeze" constitutes a taking of value from the acquirer, from the
corporation, and from the remaining minority shareholders based
upon a decision or the indecision of the board of directors with respect
to a transaction which is to occur after the board members may be
long gone. This is tantamount to saying that the owners of a company
cannot replace the board or reverse a decision which has been made
by the board of directors even though it may materially adversely
affect the corporation's and the shareholder's future and even though
106. Civil Action No. 88-190-JRR (D. Del. May 9, 1988).
107. Civil Action No. 88-C-378 (E.D. Wis. May 4, 1988).
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no irrevocable, legitimate right has been confirmed by such action.
This prevents the owners, any and all of the shareholders, from
governing the affairs of their corporation, which is far different from
legitimate statutory provisions for protecting minority shareholders.
Not only are the rights of the acquirer impaired, the rights of
the minority are impaired as well. There is no lawful way during the
"freeze" period for a corporation to effect a transaction with any
interested shareholder if the acquisition and the transaction are not
approved prior to the date the acquirer crossed the "interested shareholder" threshold. Without the consent of the "interested shareholder", no transaction with a non-affiliate or non-associate of the
"interested shareholder" may be effected even though the other
shareholders unanimously agree.
The freeze type statute would appear to raise serious constitutional questions of due process, equal protection and state interference
with interstate commerce. Perhaps these questions may not be brought
to a head in the acquisition transaction itself, but it is difficult to
conceive that if the "interested shareholder" and the minority shareholders approve a merger for the purpose of redomesticating in
another jurisdiction, the "freeze" statute will withstand their challenge
on constitutional grounds.
VII.

CONCLUSION

All of these antitakeover provisions are designed to prevent or
discourage the making of a hostile tender offer. Careful thought has
not been given to the consequences to the corporation or to the
minority shareholders after a successful acquisition. After a successful
acquisition, and assuming price payments acceptable to the shareholders, who is going to enforce these second stage provisions? Are they
not going to be mere remnants in lawyer's opinions, to the effect that
the transaction may have been unlawful but either nobody cares or
nobody has standing to object? Is the State really going to refuse to
file the documents necessary to make it effective? What will the
ultimate consequence be if this happens? Isn't the ultimate- remedy
dissolution and consequent distribution of the assets into the hands
of the shareholders who may do with them as they please? Doesn't
this, albeit in messy and more expensive fashion (without benefit to
the minority), accomplish what the control shareholder wants?
The state legislation and much of the proposed federal legislation
has only short-term, illusory benefit for management. The longer term
prospect is substantial damage for all. The management who urge
adoption of antitakeover legislation and the legislatures that adopt
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them should engage in a real analysis of the economics and workability
of such legislation rather than reacting in knee-jerk fashion to questionable declarations of constitutionality and pseudo-economic pronouncements.

